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THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
EDWARD D. RE, 1
I. INTRODUCTION
T ISwith great pride that the American asserts that "ours
is a government of laws and not of men." More than any
other person on earth he takes for granted the rights and
privileges which our forefathers asserted to be God-given and
inalienable. To him, governmental oppression simply can-
not happen here! Especially is he likely to take for granted
the fundamental principle of "equal justice under the law."
It, therefore, seems ironic indeed that at a time when he is
called upon to fight for the preservation of the American way
of life, he may, perhaps for the first time, have cause to doubt
the reality of the American heritage that he had theretofore
so naturally assumed. For it is then that he will come into
contact with the military code, and, primarily because of the
manner in which it may have been administered, is shocked
by the realization that by virtue of his new status as a
serviceman, he is deprived of many of the safeguards and
privileges that he had previously taken for granted as a
civilian.
Professional soldiers, having voluntarily chosen the pro-
fession, do not usually criticize the military code openly.
However, when the civilian is called upon to perform mili-
t Member of the Faculty, St. John's University School of Law.
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tary duties as an obligation of citizenship, his very nature
and individualism are opposed to instinctive obedience to
orders and submission to summary punishment.1 Of course,
the military training soon to be received will clearly demon-
strate even to the most individualistic non-professional
soldier the importance of military discipline.2
The training during World War II that transformed
millions of Americans into the largest and finest armed force
known in history is a magnificent achievement of which all
Americans can be justly proud. However, the rapid trans-
formation from civilian to soldier, and the nature of the new
society, proved to be too demanding for many a civilian-
soldier. Inevitably some breached the military law. Fur-
thermore, as in any community exceeding ten million, in
spite of concerted efforts for the prevention of criminal
delinquency,3 it was expected that some would violate the
1 MUNSo, LEADERSHIP FOR AmERICAN ARmY LEADERS 63 (1944). "Since
our Government is founded on the fostering of individualism, 'discipline' in
the sense of strict rule and summary punishment is a word repellent to the
American ear."
2 The Army Regulations define military discipline as follows: "Military
discipline is that mental attitude and state of training which render obedience
and proper conduct instinctive under all conditions. It is founded upon respect
for and loyalty to properly constituted authority. While it is developed pri-
marily by military drill every feature of military life has its effect upon mili-
tary discipline. It is generally indicated in an individual or unit by smartness
of appearance and action; by cleanliness and neatness of dress, equipment, or
quarters; by respect for seniors and by the prompt and cheerful execution by
subordinates of both the letter and the spirit of the legal orders of their lawful
superiors." A. R. 600-10(I). See McCoMSEY AND EDWARDS, THE SoLDEM
AND THE LAW 3 et seq. (1943).
3 The mission of the military law lectures in the service was primarily to
prevent military and criminal delinquency, and secondarily to provide prac-
tical assistance for those concerned with the efficient administration of military
justice. As enacted in 1920, the Articles of War provided that certain articles
(Nos. 1, 2, 29, 54 to 96 inclusive, and 104 to 109 inclusive) were to be read and
explained to every soldier at the time of his enlistment or muster into the ser-
vice, or within six days thereafter, and were to be read and explained once
every six months thereafter. A. W. 110, 41 STAT. 809 (1920), 10 U. S. C.
§ 1582 (1946). In 1948 this article was amended to add four important articles
(Nos. 24, 28, 97 and 121) to the list of enumerated articles. However, the
phraseology of the article was changed from "read and explained" to "read
or carefully explained." The 1948 Amendment further provided that, upon
his request, a complete text of the Articles of War and the Manual for
Courts-Martial was to be made available to any soldier for his personal ex-
amination. 62 STAT. 642 (1948), 10 U. S. C. A. § 1582 (Supp. 1950). These
are substantially the requirements of Article 137 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (hereinafter cited as U. C. M. J.), which eliminates the re-
quirement of "reading" and provides simply that the enumerated articles "shall
be carefully explained to every enlisted person." The present wording makes
it possible to comply with the Article by using training films.
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ordinary criminal code and commit offenses injurious to
society in general. However, by virtue of his new status as
a soldier, the accused was tried by a military court whether
or not the offense for which he was being tried was a military
offense or an ordinary offense in violation of the criminal
law.
It is agreed that the primary function of the armed
forces is the attainment of success in battle and the protec-
tion of the nation. That such a goal has been admirably
achieved and that discipline is indispensable to its achieve-
ment will also probably be conceded by all. However, other
functions must also be performed by the armed forces, and
all of these functions directly or indirectly play a very im-
portant role in the attainment of the primary goal. Since
all of these functions directly affect morale, all of them
assume the greatest importance. One of these auxiliary
functions is the administration of justice for the military
community. For a variety of reasons it cannot be stated that
this important function has been performed as well as the
other necessary military functions.
II. MiIlTARY JUSTICE: REFORM NECESSARY
The most severe criticism against the administration of
military justice by the courts-martial system followed World
War I and World War II. This may very well be largely
attributable to the great influx of civilians into the services
during those emergencies.
After the second World War, the criticisms and com-
plaints against the administration of military justice at-
tained proportions that could be ignored neither by the
armed forces nor the Congress. Actually, it did not matter
whether all of the criticisms and grievances were true. The
belief shared by so many Americans that justice was not had
before the court-martial was just as important as the true
facts. There is no doubt that many of the charges were un-
true and ill-founded. 4 Even the grossest misconception,
4 The findings of the War Department Advisory Committee on Military
justice show, for example, that the charge that courts-martial had convicted
innocent persons was unfair and unfounded. Rm . WAR DEP'T ADvisopY Com-
mITrR MmILITARY Jus'ncE 6 (1946).
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however, can play a part in deterring voluntary enlistments.
For example, regardless of the truth of the newspaper
accounts of the Lichfield trials to the effect that soldiers
convicted were sentenced to confinement while officers were
merely reprimanded and fined, it was reasonable t assume
that unless the air was cleared, young men and women would
stay away from the recruiting stations.5
Both the War and Navy Departments were aroused by
these criticisms. A commendable effort was made to inquire
into the truth and accuracy of the charges, and machinery
was set in motion calculated to overhaul the courts-martial
system so as to guarantee the accused a fair trial without
jeopardizing military efficiency.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice 6 represents the
culmination of the combined efforts calculated to establish
a courts-martial system that will administer military justice
in the highest American tradition. In accordance with mili-
tary and naval unification plans, and designed to meet the
needs of all branches of the armed forces, for the first time
in the history of this country, a Uniform Code of Military
Justice will govern the trial and punishment of all offenders
in any of the branches of the armed forces. This Uniform
Code, employing modern legislative terminology, substan-
tially revises the Articles of War and the Articles for the
Government of the Navy,7 and establishes the courts-martial
5 See Simpson, Courts-Martial Come to Justice, 1158 HARPERS 457 (Nov.
1946).
6 Pub. L. No. 506. 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (May 5, 1950). "Be it enacted
by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That a Uniform Code of Military Justice for the gov-
ernment of the armed forces of the United States, unifying, consolidating, re-
vising, and codifying the Articles of War, the Articles for the Government of
the Navy, and the disciplinary laws of the Coast Guard, is hereby enacted as
follows, and the articles in this section may be cited as 'Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, Article .' (sic). The Code was drafted by a special com-
mittee appointed by the Secretary of Defense. Professor Edmund M. Morgan
of the Harvard Law School was Chairman. For a list of the several com-
mittees that studied the problems of military justice and made recommenda-
tions for its improvement, see Keeffe, Universal Military Training With or
Without Reform of Courts Martial?, 33 CoRimL. L. Q. 465 (1948).
7 Military personnel is presently governed by the Articles of War, 41 STAT.
787 et seq. (1920), as amended, 10 U. S. C. A. § 1471 et seq. (Supp. 1950).
Naval personnel is presently governed by the Articles for the Government of the
Navy, REv. STAT. 1624 (1875), as amended, 34 U. S. C. § 1200 (1946).
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system that on May 31, 1951 will apply to the Army, Navy,
Air Force and Coast Guard alike.
The need for such a major revision becomes obvious
when one bears in mind that the Articles governing the Navy
adopted in 1862 are really of a Revolutionary War vintage,
being substantially the same as the first Articles for the
Government of the Navy adopted in 1775 by the Continental
Congress."
This article proposes tersely to state some of the more
substantial criticisms that brought the courts-martial system
into disrepute. Following the introductory remarks included
to familiarize the reader with the nature and function of the
court-martial, the article will examine the Uniform Code of
Military Justice to ascertain, at least tentatively, whether
Congress has supplied an appropriate legislative remedy to
obviate future criticism.
III. COURTS-MARTIAL
A. Constitutional Authorization
That body of public law which governs the military
establishment as a separate community both in peace and
war is the military law of the nation. Although, historically,
the military law of the United States is considerably older
than the Constitution,9 the latter as the organic or supreme
law of the land, is the source and authority of the military
law of this country. As was stated by Mr. Chief Justice
Chase, "The Constitution itself provides for military govern-
ment as well as civil government." 10 And further, "... there
8 Pasley and Larkin, The Navy Court Martial: Proposals for its Reform,
33 CoRNE.L L. Q. 195, 197 (1947). "The first American naval articles were
compiled by John Adams, who took from the British Articles of 1749 those
provisions which he considered suitable. They were approved by the Conti-
nental Congress on November 28, 1775, and entitled Rules for the Regulation
of the Navy of the United Colonies." The authors state that in spite of
amendments the 1862 Articles "are not far removed, in content and phrase-
ology, from the British Articles of 1749, which in turn were substantially
Cromwell's Articles of 1649."9 1 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PREcEDENTS 15, 21 (2d ed. 1920).
lo Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 137 (U. S. 1866). In this famous case
denying the jurisdiction of a military commission to try a civilian under cir-
cumstances not warranting a declaration of martial law, Mxr. Justice Davis
made remarks that are truly inspirational. "No graver question was ever
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is no law for the government of the citizens, the armies or
the navy of the United States, within American jurisdiction,
which is not contained in or derived from the Constitution.
And wherever our Army or Navy may go beyond our terri-
torial limits, neither can go beyond the authority of the
President or the legislation of Congress." 11
It is important that every member of the armed forces
be made aware of the fact that the military law of the nation
is a part of the law of the land and exists pursuant to specific
constitutional authority. In this way it will be less likely
that he will conjure up beliefs of arbitrary deprivations of
privileges and liberty.
The Constitution specifically provides that Congress
shall have power to "raise and support Armies 1.2... provide
and maintain a Navy," 13 and "... make Rules for the Gov-
ernment and Regulation of the land and naval forces." 14
The constitutional authority for military law can be inferred
from several other constitutional provisions.15 In addition
considered by this court, nor one which more nearly concerns the rights of
the whole people; for it is the birthright of every American citizen when
charged with crime, to be tried and punished according to law. The power
of punishment is, alone through the means which the laws have provided for
that purpose, and if they are ineffectual, there is an immunity from punish-
ment, no matter how great an offender the individual may be, or how much
his crimes may have shocked the sense of justice of the country, or endangered
its safety. By the protection of the law human rights are secured; withdraw
that protection, and they are at the mercy of wicked rulers, or the clamor
of an excited people. If there was law to justify this military trial, it is not
our province to interfere; if there was not, it is our duty to declare the nullity
of the whole proceedings. . . . The Constitution of the United States is a
law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the
shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circum-
stances." Id. at 118, 120.
11 Id. at 141.
12 U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8(12).
'3 U. S. CoNs?. Art. I, §8(13).
14 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8(14).
15 Congress shall have power "To define and punish . . . Offenses against
the Law of Nations;" U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8(10); "To declare War, grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land
and Water;" Id. at § 8(11); "To provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;"
Id. at § 8 (15) ; "To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of
the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of
Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress;" Id. at § 8(16); "To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Id. at § 8 (18).
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to the above legislative powers, one must add the power con-
ferred upon the executive, whereby "The President shall be
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States;" 16 and the
provisions of the Fifth Amendment declaring that "No per-
son shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise in-
famous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger .... 1, 17
B. Nature and Function
Although the above provisions do not expressly provide
for the creation of courts-martial, the Articles of War have
been enacted pursuant to the powers expressly granted to
Congress, and these Articles have specifically created a sys-
tem of courts-martial.18 Although courts-martial are not
strictly a part of the judicial system of the United States 19
16 U. S. CONST. Art. 1I, § 2. Furthermore, the President ". . . shall take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the
officers of the United States." Id. at Art. II, § 3.
17 U. S. CONsT. AMEND. V. This amendment to the Constitution inferen-
tially recognizes courts-martial and relieves these tribunals of the requirement
of indictment by Grand Jury. See Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543
(1887); Ex parte Mason, 105 U. S. 696 (1882); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97
U. S. 509 (1879); Trask v. Payne, 43 Barb. 569 (N. Y. 1865). See also
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304 (1946) (power to declare martial law
does not include power to supplant civilian laws by military orders and to
supplant courts by military tribunals, where conditions are not such as to
prevent the enforcement of the laws by the courts). To the same effect, see
Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866).
Is The army historically had had three courts-martial: a General Court-
Martial consisting of five or more members, A. W. 5, 41 STAT. 788 (1920),
10 U. S. C. § 1476 (1946); a Special Court-Martial consisting of three or
more members, A. W. 6, 41 STAT. 788 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1477 (1946);
and a Summary Court-Martial consisting of one officer, A. W. 7, 41 STAT.
788 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1478 (1946). The navy terminology for these tri-
bunals was general, summary and deck respectively. The Uniform Code of
Military Justice adopts the army terminology. The only difference under the
new code is that while formerly a General Court-Martial consisted of any
number not less than five, now the court shall consist of a law member and
any number of members not less than five. U. C. M. J. Art. 16.
19 Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (U. S. 1875). Referring to the consti-
tutional provisions pertaining to the powers of Congress over the army and
making the President Commander-in-Chief, Mr. Justice Wayne wrote, "These
provisions show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and
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since they are not "... such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish," 20 they are,
nevertheless, important administrative military tribunals to
which far-reaching powers are entrusted. The fact that they
are adjuncts of the executive power does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that they are ". . . simply instrumental-
ities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the
President as Commander-in-Chief, to aid him in properly
commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline
therein." 21 These tribunals perform a strictly judicial func-
tion in the interpretation and administration of military law,
and since their jurisdiction is exclusively of a penal nature,22
surely an accused, before these tribunals, is entitled, in the
very least, to the minimum standard of due process and "fair
punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and now prac-
tised by civilized nations; and that the power to do so is given without any
connection between it and the 3d article of the Constitution defining the judi-
cial power of the United States; indeed, the two powers are entirely inde-
pendent of each other." Id. at 79.
20 U. S. CONST. Art. III, § 1. E.s parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243 (U. S.
1863). In this case, which held that a military commission is not a court
within Article III of the Constitution and the Judiciary Act, Mr. Justice Wayne
stated, "Nor can it be said that the authority to be exercised by a military
commission is judicial . . . [in the sense that powers conferred. by Congress
upon the district judge are judicial]. It involves discretion to examine, to
decide and sentence, but there is no original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court
to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum to review or reverse its pro-
ceedings, or the writ of certiorari to revise the proceedings of a military
commission." Ex parte Vallandigham, supra at 253.
21 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PR-CEDENTS 49 (2d ed. 1920). Colonel
Winthrop in a footnote to the statement quoted in the text, cites Clode, 2 M. F.
361, who wrote the following about courts-martial in British law: "It must
never be lost sight of that the only legitimate object of military tribunals is
to aid the Crown to maintain the discipline and government of the Army."2 2 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 7 (1943) ; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
8 (1949) (hereinafter cited as M. C. M.); 1 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PREcED rs 55 (2d ed. 1920). It is to be remembered that a court-martial
does not try a person subject to military law solely for military offe nses. The
offenses for which a serviceman may be tried include all of the crimes punish-
able under the usual penal codes of the various states. A. W. 92, 41 STAT.
805 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1564 (1946), provided for the trial of murder and
rape, and Article 93, 41 STAT. 805 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1565 (1946), enu-
merated manslaughter, mayhem, arson, burglary, housebreaking, robbery, lar-
ceny, embezzlement, perjury, forgery, sodomy and for the various degrees of
assault. These articles were not substantially changed by the 1948 revision
except that the mandatory punishment for rape of "death or imprisonment for
life" was changed to "death or such other punishment as a court-martial may
direct." Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice all of these crimes are
still triable by court-martial. However, the code now devotes an entire article
to each crime and defines the offense with meticulous accuracy. These so-
called "Punitive Articles" now include the crime of extortion. U. C. M. J.
Art. 127.
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play" that is accorded a respondent before an administrative
agency performing a judicial function.23
Perhaps the most basic conflict that had to be resolved
in reforming the courts-martial system were the opposed con-
cepts concerning the basic function of the court-martial. Is
the proper function of the court-martial to enforce discipline
or to administer the criminal law? Actually the court-
martial does and should serve both functions. 24  However,
the court-martial should not be used to discipline the service-
man when what is required is additional instruction and
training. The court-martial inflicts punishment for offenses
committed, and it is an improper use of the court-martial to
try a person for non-military conduct when in fact he should
be discharged from the service for mental and physical rea-
sons which prevent his adjustment to the service.25  Further-
more, the non-commissioned officer may be reduced in grade
administratively for inefficiency,26 and non-punitive correc-
tional measures may be employed in cases of minor delin-
2 3 In Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 22 (1938), referring to the
administrative agencies, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes wrote: ". . . if these mul-
tiplying agencies deemed to be necessary in our complex society are to serve
the purposes for which they are created and endowed with vast powers, they
must accredit themselves by acting in accordance with the cherished judicial
tradition embodying the basic concepts of fair play." Mr. Justice Frankfurter
would probably speak of "fundamentals of fair play." Federal Communication
Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 143 (1940). See
also Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S.
197 (1938); Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1935); United States
v. Abilene and Southern Ry., 265 U. S. 274 (1923) ; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line, 211 U. S. 210 (1908).
24WAR DEPARTMENT TECHNICAL MANUAL 27-255, 1 (1945) (hereinafter
cited as W. D. T. M.). "Military Justice is the system for enforcing disci-
pline and administering criminal law in the Army." In spite of the extremely
limited scope of judicial review of a court-martial conviction duly approved by
the appropriate reviewing authorities, the Supreme Court has clearly recog-
nized the judicial nature and function of the court-martial. See Grafton v.
United States, 206 U. S. 333 (1907) ; In re Morrissey, 137 U. S. 157 (1890) ;
In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147 (1890); Runde v. United States, 122 U. S. 543
(1886).
25 A. R. 615-368 and A. R. 615-369 provide for the administrative discharge
of an enlisted man if he evidences habits or traits of character which render
his retention in the service undesirable, or is disqualified for service, physically
or otherwise, through his own misconduct or if he is inapt, does not possess
the required degree of adaptability to military discipline. W. D. T. M. 25-255,
6 (1945).
26 A. R. 615-5, pars. 13c-15 (1944). "Such administrative reduction is
not punishment and should not be used as such." W. D. T. M. 27-255, 7
(1945).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
quencies indicating that further training is needed. 7 In
cases of "minor" offenses, commanding officers are author-
ized to impose disciplinary punishment, involving, generally,
withholding of privileges, extra duty, and restriction to
limits.28  Under the new terminology of non-judicial punish-
ment, this power of the commanding officer has been in-
creased under the Uniform Code.20 This may very well have
the effect of decreasing the number of court-martial trials.
, Even if one were to concede that summary punishment
for minor offenses is required as a disciplinary matter, in
the more serious cases, whether the offense be of a military
nature or one of the ordinary crimes, the maintenance of
morale and the attainment of justice require that the court-
martial function as a court of law established to do justice
"without partiality, favor or affection." 30 This would apply
27 M. C. M. 103 (1943); W. D. T. M. 27-255, 7 (1945).
28 This disciplinary power of the commanding officer was found in A. W.
104, 41 STAT. 808 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1576 (1946), which limited the with-
holding of privileges, extra duty, the restriction, or the hard labor to a period
not exceeding one week. The details of this "company punishment" are found
in M. C. M. 103-106 (1943); M. C. M. 144-147 (1949); W. D. T. M. 27-255,
8-14 (1945). This is the equivalent of the navy's "captain's mast." ARTIcLES
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NAVY, Article 24; AGETON, NAVAL OFFICER'S
GUIDE 532-533 (1944). See Snedeker, Developments in the Law of Naval
Justice, 23 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 1, 20 (1947). Under former A. W. 104, 41
STAT. 808 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1576 (1946), a person had the absolute right
to demand "trial by court-martial" instead of accepting company punishment.
No such option existed in the Navy. The new code authorizes the Secretary
of each Department to make regulations as to the "applicability of this article
to an accused who demands trial by court-martial." U. C. M. J. Art. 15(b).
Each service is thereby empowered to continue its former practice.
29 U. C. M. J. Art. 15. For example, this article provides for withholding of
privileges, or extra duties, or restriction to limits for a period of two consecu-
tive weeks, and in certain cases, reduction to the next lower grade or rating.
Under this article an officer may now be deprived of a privilege, or restricted
for a period not to exceed two consecutive weeks, and a commanding officer
of specified authority may impose a forfeiture of as much as one-half pay for
a month. The provision in A. W. 104, 41 STAT. 808 (1920), 10 U. S. C.
§ 1576 (1946), which concerns appeal to the next superior authority by a per-
son who deems his punishment to be unjust or disproportionate to the offense,
is retained. U. C. M. J. Art. 15(d).
30 A. W. 19, 41 STAT. 790 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1490 (1946). Such was
part of the oath of the members of the courts-martial. The oath of the mem-
bers of the courts-martial under the Articles of War was an excellent one.
The uniform code simply provides that the members "shall take an oath or
affirmation in the presence of the accused to perform their duties faithfully."
U. C. M. J. Art. 42(a). One writer suggests that in cases of other than
minor offenses, courts-martial should "afford the substantial protections im-
plicit in the customary civilian concept of a fair trial." Wallstein, The
Revision of the Army Court-Martial System, 48 CoL. L. REv. 219, 220 (1948).
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to all courts-martial. 31
To ascertain if an offense has been committed by the ac-
cused and to impose just punishment are judicial functions
regardless of the fact that the consequences of such functions
may be the enforcement of discipline and respect for au-
thority. All must agree that the court-martial is "strictly a
criminal court" whose "proper function is to award punish-
ment upon the ascertainment of guilt." 32
C. Judicial Review
The extreme importance of according an accused tried
by a court-martial a just and fair trial in the first instance
is made obvious by an examination of the United States
Supreme Court cases upholding the absolute finality and
conclusiveness of the court-martial conviction.33  Neither
certiorari nor a writ of error is available to a serviceman
sentenced by court-martial, and in habeas corpus proceedings
the court will review only those matters deemed jurisdic-
tional.3 4  Since the only indispensable prerequisites for the
validity of a court-martial conviction are that the court be
appointed by proper authority, that its membership be in
accordance with law as to number and competency, and that
the court be invested by act of Congress with power to try
the person and the offense charged,85 it can be seen that sub-
31 See Note, The Proposed Uniform Code of Military Justice, 62 HARV.
L. REv. 1377, 1379 (1949), wherein the author concludes from the fact that
a Summary Court-Martial may try only enlisted personnel and can impose only
limited sentences, etc., that ". . . the summary court would seem to be de-
signed to perform disciplinary rather than judicial functions."
32 1 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 55 (1920). The court-
martial was formerly also called a "court of honor" because of its power to
punish dishonorable conduct where it has affected the reputation and discipline
of the service. In Fletcher v. United States, 26 Ct. C1. 563 (1891), the court
made the following interesting statement: "In military life there is a higher
code termed honor which holds its society to stricter accountability; and it is
not desirable that the standard of the Army shall come down to the require-
ments of a criminal code."
33 Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U. S. 109 (1895) ; Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S.
167 (1886); Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564 (1885) ; Dynes v. Hoover, 20
How. 65 (U. S. 1857). See also In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1 (1946); Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942).
34 Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333, 347 (1907), and cases cited
therein. Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13 (1879).
3 Ibid.; M. C. M. 7 (1943); M. C. M. 8-9 (1949). Note, The Scope of
Review Over Courts-Martial on Habeas Corpus, 41 Iti. L. REv. 260 (1946).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
sequent judicial review is not of a sufficiently broad scope to
test the requirement of adjective due process in the granting
of procedural safeguards, preceding, during, and subsequent
to trial. It cannot be said that the attitude inherent in some
lower federal court cases,36 which deems additional matters
jurisdictional, has been approved by the United States Su-
preme Court. The attitude of the judges who endeavored to
expand the scope of judicial review of the court-martial
conviction by considering certain procedural requirements
and safeguards as jurisdictional, doubtlessly, was calculated
to make the objection of lack of due process a matter for
judicial review. Such, in fact, is the trend in non-military
law cases. 7  However, in reversing the Court of Appeals
decision in Humphrey v. S'mith,3 8 the Supreme Court indi-
cated disapproval of the inceptive trend to broaden the tradi-
36 See Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238 (M. D. Pa. 1946), wherein it was
held that an individual does not cease to be a "person" within the protection
of the Fifth Amendment by virtue of his entry into the armed forces, and
that the basic guaranty of fairness afforded by the due process clause also
applies to a defendant in a criminal proceeding in a federal military court.
The prejudicial errors at the pre-trial investigation and during the trial de-
prived the accused of due process. The failure of the military reviewing
authority to order a new trial was deemed "an abuse of legal discretion."
Henry v. Hodges, 171 F. 2d 401 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Anthony v. Hunter, 71 F.
Supp. 823 (D. C. Kan. 1947) (incompetent defense counsel). See cases dis-
cussed in Pasley, The Federal Courts Look at te Court-Martial, 12 U. OF
PITr. L. REv. 7 (1950).
37 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942) ; Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S.
329 (1941); Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941) ; Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U. S. 458 (1938); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923).
38336 U. S. 695 (1949). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
had held that Article of War 70, 41 STAT. 802 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1542
(1946), requiring a "thorough and impartial investigation" before referring a
case for trial to a General Court-Martial, was mandatory and jurisdictional.
The Supreme Court held the A. W. 70, 41 STAT. 802 (1920), 10 U. S. C.
§ 1542 (1946), was merely directory and reversed the judgment of the lower
court. Mr. Justice Murphy, who dissented, Justices Douglas and Rutledge
concurring, was of the opinion that the non-compliance with the preliminary
investigation requirements was a matter of proper inquiry in habeas corpus.
Commenting upon this view Dean Reppy states that it "seems correct, and
also favors the liberty of the individual." REPPY, CivL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 23 (1951). See Pasley, The Federal Courts Look at the Court-
Martial, 12 U. oF Prrr. L. REv. 7, 19 (1950), "I am convinced that in this
case his [Mr. Justice Murphy's] zeal was misguided and that the decision of
the majority was correct." This case is discussed in 34 IowA L. Rv. 686
(1949). See also Schwartz, Habeas Corius and Court-Martial Deviations
from the Articles of War, 14 Mo. L. REv. 147 (1949). The requirement of
the pre-trial investigation is now found in Article 32 of the new code; how-
ever, it is expressly stated therein that "The requirements of this article shall
be binding on all persons administering this code, but .failure to follow them
in any case shall not constitute jurisdictional error." U. C. M. J. Art. 32(d).
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tional scope of judicial review in the court-martial cases.
In any event, it is extremely doubtful whether in future cases
the failure to comply with the traditional procedural provi-
sions of the articles governing the armed forces will be con-
sidered a "jurisdictional defect" or otherwise a lack of due
process.39  One should not be lulled into a false sense of
security by those decisions--doubtlessly the effects of the
agitation and criticisms against the courts-martial system-
and lose sight of the traditional judicial attitude according
to which the courts will not undertake the administration
of military law.
The fact that the Code establishes a Court of Military
Appeals to be composed of three civilian judges 40 does not
necessarily mean that it ushers in an era favoring a liberality
of judicial review. Although the creation of a Court of Mili-
tary Appeals 41 constitutes a revolutionary reform, obviously
calculated to obviate the criticism that all appellate review
was conducted solely by the military,42 it doubtlessly will
become the final arbiter on matters of military law. This
will be a court of last resort,4 3 and again only the constitu-
tional right of habeas corpus remains.4"
To ascertain the legislative intent as to whether a failure
to comply with the pre-trial investigative procedure consti-
39 But see Schwartz, Habeas Corpu and Court-Martial Deviations from the
Articles of War, 14 Mo. L. REV. 147, 149, 160 (1949), wherein the author
apparently considering the court-martial like the other independent regulatory
agencies, concludes that "... . civil courts can set aside the decisions of courts-
martial when the provisions of the Articles of War have not been substantially
complied with." The ethical desirability of such a conclusion will not be ques-
tioned; however, it is clear that such has not been the law and it is extremely
doubtful if such will be the law in the court-martial cases.
40 U. C. M. J. Art. 67.
41The 1948 articles (A. W. 50, 41 STAT. 797 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1521
(1946)) provided for a "Judicial Council" consisting of three general officers
of the Judge Advocate General's Corps.
42 H. R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong.. 1st Sess. 6 (1949). REPORT OF THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE UNIFORM CODE.
43 SEN. REP. No. 468, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1949). REPORT OF THE
SENATE COmmr=EE-ON ARMEaD SERVICES ON THE UNIFORM CODE.
44H. R. REs. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949). REPORT OF THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES ON THE UNIFORM CODE. The deter-
mination by the Court of Military Appeals now undoubtedly forms a part of
the administrative remedy that must be exhausted before resort is had to the
judiciary. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938);
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1908). The courts prob-
ably will take the same view regarding the right to petition for a new trial.
U. C. M. J. Art. 73.
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tutes a jurisdictional defect that may be raised in a habeas
corpus proceeding, one need merely read the article dealing
with "Investigation" which declares boldly and bluntly that
the failure to follow the requirements of the article "shall not
constitute jurisdictional error." 45 Since such has been the
construction very recently given by the United States Su-
preme Court to former Article of War 70 in 'Humphrey v.
Snith48 the probability of a successful constitutional attack
upon the new provision is too slight to warrant serious con-
sideration. 4 7
Hencd, the continued necessity for fairness and equity
in the initial application and administration of the military
code becomes manifest to all concerned with justice and mili-
tary efficiency.
D. Criticisms of the System
Many of the criticisms of the courts-martial system are
matters of common knowledge. However, if the most pro-
nounced criticisms were to be stated, they probably would
be the following:
1. "Equal" justice was not done. This complaint was
not that innocent men were found guilty and punished, but
rather, that the standard of punishment was not the same
for all offenders.
45 U. C. M. J. Art. 32(d) See note 38 supra.48336 U. S. 695 (1949). It was held that while a court in a habeas corpus
proceeding may not consider the question of guilt or innocence of the peti-
tioner, it may consider the question of jurisdiction; however, failure to comply
with the requirements of A. W. 70, 41 STAT. 802 (1920) 10 U. S. C. § 1542(1946), was held not to be jurisdictional error. J.J. Murphy, Douglas and
Rutledge dissented. See note 38 supra.
47 The House Committee on Armed Services stated that although the in-
vestigative procedure required by the article is mandatory on military per-
sonnel under duty to administer it, and non-compliance may be a ground for
reversal by a reviewing authority under the code, "a failure to conduct such
an investigation or less than full compliance, which does not naterially preju-dice the substantial rights of an accused, shall not constitute jurisdictional
error." (Emphasis added.) H. R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 20(1949) ; SEN~. REP. No. 468, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 16, 17 (1949). It is doubtful
that the italicized portion intends to convey the inference that to prejudice
materially the substantial rights of the accused is a jurisdictional error. Non-
compliance with procedural rules is an offense punishable as a court-martial
may direct. U. C. M. J. Art. 98.
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2. The court-martial did not function impartially and
independently of the wishes of the commanding officer, but
was the means through which the commanding officer exer-
cised his will to punish members of his command.
3. Since only officers were competent to sit on courts-
martial, enlisted personnel were thereby deprived of the
"right" to be tried by other enlisted personnel.
4. The doing of justice was a part-time job delegated
to the untrained and the amateur.
5. Untrained and incompetent counsel was assigned to
"defend" an accused being tried by a court-martial.
6. The so-called "review" of the findings and sentence of
the court-martial conviction was a mere "rubber-stamping"
of the conviction-all steps in the review process having
been within the "chain of command."
Other specific criticisms could be enumerated, but actu-
ally they would stem from the above-stated general observa-
tions. By the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, Congress has succeeded in bringing about uniformity
in the laws of the various branches of the service. Whether
Congress succeeded in effecting a true reform in the courts-
martial system so as to prevent the recurrence of the wide-
spread dissatisfaction that followed World War II depends
upon the provisions of the Code and, more important, the
manner of its administration.
IV. PERSONNEL
A. Prosecution and Defense
Perhaps the most amazing thing about the administra-
tion of military justice was the fact that it was not neces-
sarily regarded as a function requiring specialized legal
skills. One author remarks that a striking feature of such
a system was that lawyers had "so little to do with it. '48
48 Karlen, Lawyers and Courts-Martial, [1946] Wis. L. REv. 240. AGFTOX,
NAVAL OFFICER'S GUiDE 547 (1944). "Proper presentation and successful
prosecution of cases before a general court-martial do not require exceptional
brilliance or extensive legal training."
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This probably stemmed from the conviction that the func-
tion was considered essentially military and not judicial. It
was, therefore, not uncommon that legal duties devolved
upon legal officers who not only were not lawyers but who
may have had no legal training whatever. It can hardly be
said that a series of "military law" lectures, no matter how
thorough, either at West Point or at Officer Candidate
School would constitute legal training justifying the assign-
ment of such officers to prosecution or defense counsel duties.
Under the system, therefore, it was possible for a court-
martial with authority to impose severe punishment to try
even the most difficult case involving complex questions of
law and fact without a single lawyer being present during
the proceedings. 49
Furthermore, it was apparent that there is no inherent
simplicity in military law and that it cannot be learned
easily and quickly. Difficult questions of substantive law
often arose during the trial of a case-not to mention the
intricate problems of evidence that plagued law members
and presidents of courts-martial-on those occasions when
defense counsel did see the problems and made proper objec-
tions. The Manual for Courts-Martial, which is a compact
legal text covering the entire field of criminal law, evidence
and procedure, can give even the most conscientious officer
intellectual indigestion. Legal training was necessary to
appreciate fully the system established by the Articles of
War and the Manual for Courts-Martial.50
It ii in this area of personnel that the Code offers true
reform by assuring that in the more serious offenses the trial
and defense of court-martial cases will be entrusted to legally
trained persons. The Code provides in mandatory terms that
49 M. C. M. 28 (par. 38c) (1943); W. D. T. M. 27-255, 73 (1945). "The
Appointing authority may expressly direct that [the law member] be present
at all trials or at a particular trial. If there is such a directive, the trial
cannot proceed if for any reason the law member is absent (par. 38c, M. C. M.).
If there is no such directive, the absence of the law member does not affect
the validity of the proceedings." See also Holtzoff, Administration of Justice
in the United States Army, 22 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rv. 1, 11 (1947). "In fact,
the chiefs of the armed forces did not seem to recognize law as a profession
in the same sense in which they recognized medicine. This attitude has been
almost traditional in the service ... "
50 Karlen, Lawyers and Courts-Martial, [1946] Wis. L. REv. 240, 244, 247,
249.
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any person who is appointed as trial counsel 51 or defense
counsel in a General Court-Martial "shall be a judge advo-
cate..., who is a graduate of an accredited law school or is
a member of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest
court of a State; or shall be a person who is a member of the
bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State." 52
The Code further provides that such persons "shall be certi-
fied as competent to perform such duties by The Judge
Advocate General of the armed force of which he is a
member." r3 This provision of the Code is a substantial
improvement over the 1948 articles because it eliminates the
exception "if available." 54 Of course, the 1948 articles in
themselves constituted a substantial improvement because
formerly no provision whatever was made for the employ-
ment of duly qualified personnel regardless of availability.
Nevertheless, the requirement of the Code in General Court-
Martial cases is welcomed for it does not permit of the pos-
sibility of abuse of the availability requirement. The Code
provision is particularly desirable for it not only establishes
the preliminary qualifications for prosecution and defense
counsel personnel, but realistically requires a certification as
to their competence before being assigned to perform such
duties.
In Special Court-Martial cases there is no requirement
that the trial counsel be a lawyer. However, the Code pro-
vides that if trial counsel be a lawyer, defense counsel must
be similarly qualified.5 5 These provisions inject an element
of fairness in courts-martial not always present formerly.
Since it is believed that the failure to use qualified personnel
to administer the military law was perhaps the most basic
reason for its occasional maladministration, it is impossible
to over-emphasize the importance of the requirements provid-
ing for competent trial and defense personnel.
51 The prosecutor was formerly called the Trial Judge Advocate. A. W.
11, 41 STAT. 789 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1482 (1946).
52U. C. M. J. Art. 27(b) (1).
53 U C.M. J. Art. 27 (b)(2).
5A W. 11, 41 STAT. 789 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1482 (1946).
5 U. C. M. J. Art. 27(c). The code does not affect the right of an ac-
cused to be represented by counsel of choice before a general or special court-
martial. U. C. M. J. Art. 38(b). This right existed under the 1920 articles.
A. W. 17, 41 STAT. 790 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1488 (1946).
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In this regard it may be mentioned that the Code retains
the provisions of the 1948 articles whereby the accused could
have requested representation by civilian or military counsel
during the pre-trial investigation.56 The articles also pro-
vided that if after such investigation the charges were for-
warded for trial they were to be accompanied by a statement
of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides." The
Code goes further and provides that a copy of such state-
ments "shall be given to the accused." 58 Of course, the Code
does not affect the right of an accused to be represented
before a General or Special Court-Martial by civilian counsel
of choice if he so desires.5 9
An additional matter calculated to assure an accused
competent representation and a thorough consideration of
his case is the provision for appellate counsel.60 This new
provision may very well have the effect of assuring an accused
that the review or appellate procedure following trial and
conviction will not be a perfunctory routine matter, but
rather will consist of an earnest effort to correct errors and
protect the substantial rights of the accused. Interestingly
enough, the Code also provides for the submission of a brief
on behalf of the accused in the event of conviction.6 1 Al-
though this was a practice occasionally followed by defense
counsel, since the matter is now one of right, the brief need
no longer be submitted in an apologetic manner.
B. Law Officer
Perhaps the greatest reform in the Army Court-Martial
system in 1920 was the addition of a law member to the
6U. C. M. J. Art. 32(b) ; A. W. 46(b), 62 STAT. 633 (1948), 10 U. S.
C. A. § 1517 (Supp. 1950).
57 A. W. 46(b), 62 STAT. 633 (1948), 10 U. S. C. A. § 1517 (Supp. 1950).
58 U. C. M. J. Art. 32(b). These provisions are in the article on "Inves-
tigation" stating that no charge shall be referred to a general comrt-martial
for trial until a thorough and impartial investigation of all the matters set
forth therein has been made.
59A. W. 17, 41 STAT. 790 (1920), 10 U. S. C. A. § 1488 (1927); A. W.
11, 62 STAT. 629 (1948), 10 U. S. C. A. § 1482 (Supp. 1950); U. C. M. J.
Art. 38(b).
60 U. C. M. J. Art. 70. Appellate counsel, both for the Government and
the defense, must meet the qualifications of Article 27(b) (1). U. C. M. 3.
Art. 70(a).62 U. C. M. J. Art. 38(c).
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General Court-Martial.62 The law member was to be a mem-
ber of the Judge Advocate General's Department. However,
since the statute permitted the employment of other officers
when members of that department were "not available, '6 3
the real benefits of the presence of the law member were often
lost.6 4  The principal duty of the law member of a General
Court-Martial was to rule on all interlocutory questions
other than challenges. His ruling on matters of admissibility
of evidence was final.6 5  However, in all other respects he
had all of the duties and powers of the other members of the
court, and hence had the right to deliberate with the court
and vote upon the guilt or innocence of the accused.6
The Code supplants the law member with a law officer
who, although performing functions similar to those of the
former law member, is not a member of the court. Under the
Code, the law officer is empowered to make final rulings on
all interlocutory questions, except on a motion to dismiss
and a motion relating to the sanity of the accused. 7 Further-
more, the law officer, before a vote is taken on the findings,
and in the presence of the accused and counsel, shall instruct
the court as to the elements of the offense, presumption of
innocence, burden of proof, and that if there is a reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused, the doubt shall be re-
solved in his favor and he shall be acquitted.66 Under the
circumstances it was thought best to deprive the law officer
of the voting privilege. 9
Since the navy court-martial has not had a law member,
the provisions of the Code represent a long overdue reform.
However, it cannot be said that as far as the army court-
62 See Keeffe, Universal Military Training With or Without Reform of
Courts Martial? 33 CORNELL L. Q. 465, 463 (1948).
63A. W. 8, 41 STAT. 788 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1479 (1946).64 Keeffe, supra note 62 at 468; Pasley and Larkin, The Navy Court Mar-
tial: Proposals for its Reform, 33 CORNEL L. Q. 195, 208 (1947). Whelchel
v. McDonald, 71 Sup. Ct. 146 (1950) (the fact that the law member of a
court-martial had not been named from the judge Advocate General's De-
partment was insufficient to establish a case of gross abuse of discretion where
no showing was made as to the availability of such member).
65 M. C. M. 29, 39, 40 (1943).
668M. C. M. 29 (1943).
67U. C. M. J. Art. 51(b).
38U. C. M. J. Art. 51(c).
GO U. C. M. J. Art. 26(b). As was the case with the Law Member, the
law officer cannot be peremptorily challenged. U. C. M. J. Art. 41(b).
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martial is concerned the new code provisions taking such an
officer off the court at a time when he may be needed most
are true reformj 0 It seems clear that the intent Was to
create, as nearly as possible, a position akin to that of a
judge in a civil trial. It also may have been the intent of
the framers to remove the influence of such a "judge" from
the deliberations of the court, and "whatever influence that
judge exercised should be on the record." 71
Although it is questionable whether the Code provisions
are superior to the 1948 articles in this respect 7 2 it is likely
that the new law officer, not being a member of the court,7 3
will receive greater respect than formerly since, in fact, his
status is now much closer to that of judge. Since he does
not vote on the guilt or innocence of the accused, he may
enjoy the respect and dignity flowing from judicial impar-
tiality.
C. Membership of Court
During the 1947 congressional hearings on military jus-
tice legislation, a very controversial question that had to be
resolved pertained to the eligibility of warrant officers and
enlisted personnel to serve as members of a General or
Special Court-Martial. The Navy-sponsored bill f6r the
amendment of the Articles for the Government of the Navy
contained no provision authorizing enlisted personnel to sit
as members of a court-martial. 74  Nevertheless, in deference
to public demand, for the first time in the history of our
military law, the 1948 Articles extended the eligibility re-
quirements to warrant officers and enlisted personnel for the
70 Under the code provisions the law officer shall not consult with the mem-
bers of the court except in the presence of the accused and counsel, other than
on the form of the findings as provided in Article 39. U. C. M. J. Art. 26(b).
71 Hearings before House Committee on Armed Services on H. R. 2498,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 607-608 (1949). SE-N. REP. No. 468, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1949).
72A. W. 8, 41 STAT. 788 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1479 (1946).
73 The Code provides that the General Court-Martial shall consist of a
"law officer and any number of members not less than five." U. C. M. J.
Art. 16(1). This system of having an officer not a member of the court was
found in the proposed Navy bill, which, in this matter, follows the British
system. See Keeffe, supra note 62 at 470.
74 S. 1338, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
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trial of warrant officers and enlisted personnel.75 The Code
has adopted the 1948 reform and hereafter an enlisted man
about to be tried by General or Special Court-Martial may
personally request in writing that enlisted persons serve on
the court. After such request at least one-third of the total
membership of the court shall consist of enlisted personnel.76
The Code retains the limitation found in the 1948 Articles to
the effect that the enlisted persons on the court were not to
be members of the same unit as the accused.77 However, the
Code excuses compliance with the request of the accused if
"eligible enlisted persons cannot be obtained on account of
physical conditions or military exigencies." 78 It is question-
able if this additional limitation upon the right to have en-
listed personnel on the court was either wise or necessary.
The failure to comply with the "request" of an accused en-
listed man in this regard will give rise to a new source of
complaint. It is clear that a mere inconvenience in the pro-
curement of qualified persons from units other than that of
the accused is not a sufficient ground to proceed to trial
without enlisted personnel on the court. This follows from
the requirement of the Code that when such persons cannot
be obtained, "the convening authority shall make a detailed
written statement, to be appended to the record, stating why
they could not be obtained." 79 The legislative intent is clear
that the convening authority cannot arbitrarily deprive an
accused of the right acquired since the 1948 reform of the
Articles of War.80
The benefits flowing from the presence of enlisted mem-
bers on the court-martial are perhaps more psychological
than real. Since the convening authority shall appoint mem-
bers who "in his opinion, are best qualified for the duty by
reason of age, education, training, experience, length of ser-
'A. W. 4, 62 STAT. 628 (1948), 10 U. S. C. A. § 1475 (Supp. 1950);
ALYEA, MILITARY JUSTICE UNDER THE 1948 AmENDED ARTicLES OF WAR 5(1949).
76 U. C. M. J. Art. 25(c).77 U. C. M. J.Art. 25 (c) (1).
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 H. R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1949); SEN. REP. No.
468, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 15 (1949).
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vice and judicial temperament," 81 it does not appear likely
that inexperienced soldiers will be placed on the court jury-
fashion. Since it is probable that non-commissioned officers
will be the "qualified" members appointed, it is hard to see
how any far-reaching change will be effected by the presence
of the enlisted members on the court. Although it is true
that the presence of the enlisted man on the court may be
regarded as a step toward the democratization of the armed
forces, it should not be assumed that the non-commissioned
officer-if he be really a good one-is any less aware of the
needs of discipline than any officer. Furthermore, if one
does make the unfounded assumption that an enlisted person
will be any more lenient than any officer, it should be re-
membered that, excepting a conviction which carries a man-
datory death penalty, a unanimous verdict is not required for
conviction and sentence. 2 Hence, the determining votes re-
main the votes of the officer members, and any prediction as
to the concrete effects of this reform would be sheer specula-
tion.
V. "COMMAND CONTROL"
A. Appointing of Court
Despite overwhelming agreement among non-military
circles that it was desirable to eliminate "command control"
in courts-martial, every proposal calculated to create an in-
dependent court was characterized as "impractical" by mili-
tary authorities. In this respect, the Code maintains intact
the very system which was criticized as far back as 1919 by
Senators Norris and Chamberlain8 3 and adheres to the tra-
ditional method of appointing courts-martial.8 34 Therefore,
with minor changes, such as authorizing the Secretary of a
Department to convene a General Court-Martial,85 the com-
81U. C. M. J. Art. 25(d)(2).
82U. C. M. J. Art. 52. In non-death cases, two-thirds of the members
must concur for conviction. Sentence to life imprisonment or confinement in
excess of ten years requires concurrence of three-fourths of the members
present. A two-thirds concurrence is required in all other cases.
83 See Farmer and Wels, Comnwnd Cwtrol-or Military Justice? 24 N. Y.
U. L. Q. Rxv. 263, 273 (1949).
84 U. C. M. J. Art. 22-24.
85 U. C.M. J. Art. 22(a)(2).
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manding officer still appoints the members of the court, the
law officer, the trial counsel, the defense counsel, refers the
case for trial, and thereafter reviews the court's findings and
sentence. Suggestions that members of the court be ap-
pointed by the Judge Advocate General or from a panel sub-
mitted to the Commanding Officer have been completely
rejected.
Some have pointed out that the placing of the machinery
of justice in the hands of military commanders cannot be
justified on the ground that it "fixes responsibility." 86 It
has also been attempted to show that such "command con-
trol" is "subversive of morale." 87 Although it is probably
true that the War Department Advisory Committee on Mili-
tary Justice 8 "received a rather exaggerated impression of
the prevalence or seriousness of pressure exerted on courts-
martial," 11 a former Secretary of the Army has stated that
"there were doubtless instances where appointing authorities
entirely misconceived their duties and functions and over-
stepped the bounds of propriety." 90 Therefore, since the
system was not to be changed, the 1948 articles very properly
included a new article making it unlawful to influence the
action of a court-martial. 91 The Code incorporates the pro-
visions of the 1948 article, and, in addition thereto, expressly
prohibits the convening authority from influencing the law
officer or counsel.92 Although this provision of the Code does
not expressly declare that "unlawfully influencing action of
court" is a punishable offense, the Code does provide that
80 Karlen, The Personal Factor in Military Jrutice, [1946] Wis. L. REv.
394, 407.
87 REP. WAR DEPT ADvisoRY Comm. MILITARY JUsTICE 7 (1946). Pro-
fessor Keeffe observes that the military viewpoint that the court-martial system
is an arm of the commander in the enforcement of discipline "arises out of
the continental origin of the court-martial system which unlike our common
law, comes down to us from Gustavus Adolphus and has its basis in the mili-
tary law of ancient Rome." Keeffe, Universal Military Training With or
Without Reform of Courts Martial? 33 CORNELL L. Q. 465, 473 (1948).BsThis is the committee of which Mr. Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt
was chairman. The other members were: Judge Alexander Holtzoff, Judge
Frederick E. Crane, Judge Morris A. Soper, Walter P. Armstrong, Joseph
W. Henderson, William T. Joyner, Jacob M. Lashly and Floyd E. Thompson.89 Royal, Revisi.o of the Military Justice Process as Proposed by the War
Department, 33 VA&. L. REv. 269, 275 (1947).0 Ibid.
91 A. W. 88, 62 STAT. 639 (1948), 10 U. S. C. A. § 1560 (Supp. 1950).
92 U. C. M. J. Art. 37.
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the intentional failure to comply with any provision of the
Code "shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." 9
Such provisions, although desirable, are not substitutes for
the establishment of an independent court. Although the
provision making it an offense to influence the action of a
court clearly and unmistakably declares the duty of non-
interference with the judicial functions of those charged with
the administration of military justice, the more effective
deterrent is still the sense of honor of the would-be offender
rather than the fear of punishment. The practical difficul-
ties in preferring charges against one's commanding officer
need not be dwelt upon here. One cannot easily lose sight
of the fact that the commanding officer still controls duty
assignments, promotions, leaves, and fitness reports of the
persons in question.
B. "Clemency" Review by Convening Authority
The statement by Colonel Winthrop that the judgment
of a court-martial, so far as its execution is concerned, is
"incomplete and inconclusive, being in the nature of a recom-
mendation only," 94 is as accurate a statement of the law
today as it was when originally made many years ago. The
Code continues the established practice. After every trial by
court-martial the record of the trial is forwarded to the au-
thority that convened the court for the initial review.95
Under the Code the convening authority is required to refer
the record of every General Court-Martial to the staff judge
advocate or legal officer "who shall submit his written
opinion thereon to the convening authority." 96 Although
the convening authority may ignore such written opinion, it
will go forward with the record and may be considered by
subsequent reviewing authorities.
While the powers of the convening authority do not per-
mit the setting aside of an acquittal or the increasing of the
9s U. C. M. J. Art. 98(2).9 4 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 447 (2d ed. 1920). For an
excellent treatment of the history and development of appellate review, see
Fratcher, Appellate Review in American Military Law, 14 Mo. L. REv. 15
(1949).
95 U. C. M. J. Art. 60 (initial action on the record).
96 U. C. M. 3. Art. 61.
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punishment imposed by the court-martial, 97 the power of re-
view has been subject to severe criticism. It represents a
failure to entrust to the court the full responsibility of de-
ciding the case before it and establishing an appropriate
sentence based upon the evidence.98 Surely, no one objects
to the clemency exercised by the convening authority in
reducing the sentence imposed by the court. What is objec-
tionable is the resulting practice whereby the court imposes
an excessively severe sentence upon the assumption that the
commanding officer who convened the court will reduce it to
an extent that he will consider just and conducive to the
maintenance of discipline. This practice is tantamount to a
delegation of the court's judicial function to the convening
authority, and it is not responsive to say that the sentence
as reduced is appropriate to the offense.99 The observation
seems valid that the practice of reducing excessive sentences
imposed by a court-martial will lead to a distrust of the
system. Since not all such sentences may be corrected on
review, the practice is neither just nor conducive to the cul-
tivation of habits of responsibility in the courts-martial
themselves. It is earnestly hoped that the new k~auual for
Courts-Martial will speak emphatically and clearly on this
matter and will impress upon all concerned the importance
of a fair trial and a just sentence upon the evidence imposed
by the trial court itself.
VI. APPELLATE REVIEW
A. Board of Review
If the sentence as approved affects a general or flag
officer, or extends to death, dismissal of an officer, cadet, or
midshipman, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or con-
finement for one year or more, 100 the record is referred to a
Board of Review. Although the Board of Review, to be com-
97 U. C. M. J. Art. 62(b).
98 Keeffe, Universal Military Training With or Without Reform of Courts
Martial? 33 CoRmxF.L L. Q. 465, 472 (1948).
09 Many cases of outrageous sentences reduced by the convening authority
can be found. See REPORT OF GEaEu COURT MARTIAL SENTMcE REvIaw
BoARn TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY § 1 (1947).
10oU. C. M. J. Art. 66(b).
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posed of not less than three officers, was established by the
1948 articles,1"' the Code further provides that each member
of the Board of Review "shall be a member of the bar of a
Federal court or of the highest court of a State of the United
States." 102
On the basis of the entire record, the Board of Review
shall affirm only such findings of "guilty" and such part of
the sentence as it finds correct in law and fact. The Board
of Review is granted extensive powers since it is authorized
to "weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses,
and determine controverted questions of fact, recognizing
that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses." 103 The
latter clause sounds in the nature of an exhortation calcu-
lated to make the Board aware of the fact that its primary
duty is to correct errors, and not to substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court on questions of fact. The main
objection to an indiscriminate use of this power of review is
not that the Board can substitute its judgment for that of
the convening authority. 10 4  The objection should be aimed
against the setting aside of the findings of fact of the trial
court. Obviously, the ordinary rules of law should prevail
in the review process, and no finding of fact is to be set aside
unless clearly contrary to the weight of evidence. The policy
must be such as to inculcate in the members of the court a
definite awareness of the importance of their function and
their responsibilities.
Unless there is to be further action by the President or
the Secretary of the Department or the Court of Military
Appeals, the Judge Advocate General shall instruct the con-
vening authority to take action in accordance with the deci-
sion of the Board of Review. 10 5
101 A. W. 50, 62 STAT. 635 (1948), 10 U. S. C. A. § 1521 (Supp. 1950).
The 1948 articles also provided for the creation of a Judicial Council com-
posed of three general officers.
102 U. C. M. J. Art. 66(a).
103 U. C. M. J. Art. 66(c).
104 See WENER, THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 15 (1950).
105U. C. M. J. Art. 66(e). The Code provides that the Judge Advocates
General of the armed forces shall prescribe uniform rules of procedure for
proceedings in and before the Boards of Review. U. C. M. J. Art. 66(f).
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B. Court of Military Appeals
In the review of matters of law,10 6 as has been indi-
cated,10 7 the Code establishes a civilian Court of Military
Appeals, which shall review the record in the following
cases: xo
(1) All cases in which the sentence, as affirmed by a
Board of Review, affects a general or flag officer, or extends
to death;
(2) All cases reviewed by a Board of Review which the
Judge Advocate General orders forwarded to the court for
review; and
(3) All cases reviewed by a Board of Review in which,
upon petition of the accused and on good cause shown, the
court has granted a review.
For cases of the last-enumerated category the accused
is given a thirty-day period from the time that he is notified
of the decision of the Board of Review to petition the Court
of Military Appeals for a grant of review, and the Court must
act upon such petition within thirty days of its receipt.10 9
However, in this third category, the review of the action may
be limited in respect to the issues specified in the grant of
review."10
The Court of Military Appeals may set aside the find-
ings and sentence, and order either a rehearing or a dismissal
of the charges."' After the Court has acted on a case, it may
direct the Judge Advocate General' to return the record to
the Board of Review for further review in accordance with
the decision of the court. If the Court has ordered a rehear-
ing the Judge Advocate General shall instruct the convening
authority to take action in accordance with that decision, but
106 "The Court of Military Appeals shall take action only with respect to
matters of law." U. C. M. J. Art. 67(d).
107 See notes 40-44 supra.
108 U. C. M. J. Art 67(b).
109U. C. M. J. Art. 67(c).
11OU. C. M. J. Art. 67(d).
"I U. C. M. J. Art. 67(e).
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if the convening authority finds a rehearing impracticable,
he may dismiss the charge.112
As noted previously, the accused may request to be
represented by appellate counsel before the Board of Review
and Court of Military Appeals," 3 or if he so desires he may
engage civilian counsel for such appeal. 1 4
C. Eamecution of Sentences
As is true with all court-martial sentences, no sentence
may be executed until final action is had thereon. A sentence
extending to death or involving a general or flag officer shall
not be executed until approved by the President."15 Sen-
tences affecting other officers, cadets, and midshipmen shall
not be executed until first approved by the Secretary of the
Department, or such Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary
as may be designated by him." 6 In this regard the Code
provides that'in time of war or national emergency the au-
thorities specified may commute a sentence or dismissal to
reduction to any enlisted grade." 7 Under the 1948 ar-
ticles 118 a General Court-Martial was authorized, in time of
war, to reduce an officer to the grade of private. However,
the draftsmen of the Code were of the opinion that it was
more appropriate to vest such power in the Secretary of the
Department rather than in the court-martial.
VII. PUNITIVE ARTICLES
Some Improvements Effected by the Code
A final matter that warrants mention is the improve-
ment effected by the Code in the so-called punitive articles.
The Articles of War in this respect had been deficient in that
they did not define most of the important military and civil
'112U. C. M. J. Art. 67(f).
113 U. C. M. J. Art. 70(c) (1); see note 59 supra.
114 U. C. M. J. Art. 70(d).
115 U. C. M. J. Art. 71 (a).
16U. C. M. J. Art. 71(b).
117 Ibid.
"s A. W. 44, 62 STAT. 633 (1948), 10 U. S. C. A. § 1515 (Supp. 1950);
M. C. M. 128 (1948).
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offenses. The definition of the offenses was left to the
Manual. Furthermore, altogether too many common offenses
were dealt with under the catch-all general article 119 thereby
making it possible for the prosecutor actually to legislate
new offenses into the military law.
The Code now contains a well-drawn penal code that
defines not merely the military offenses but also most of the
civil types of crimes. In addition to the advantage of having
all offenses for all of the armed forces stated in one com-
prehensive code, the Code now provides a definition of
principals, accessories, conviction of lesser included offense,
attempts, conspiracy and solicitation. 120  Since the Code
specifically defines certain offenses formerly dealt with under
the general article denouncing all neglects and disorders to
the prejudice of good order and military discipline,121 it is
hoped that there may be a disappearance of the belief shared
by many enlisted persons that "if the C. 0. wants to court-
martial someone he can always do so under the 96th Article
of War." This general article and the 104th Article of War,
authorizing the Commanding Officer to impose company pun-
ishment, were the two articles that practically all soldiers
knew by name and article number!
The Code specifically defines the offenses of "missing
movement" 122 which is really an aggravated form of absence
without leave,123 failure to obey a lawful general order or
regulation, 24 cruelty, oppression or maltreatment of any
person subject to one's orders,'125 noncompliance with the
procedural rules or provisions of the Code, 20 misconduct as
a prisoner of war,127 the making of false official state-
ments,128 improper hazarding of a vessel,12 9 drunken or reck-
29 A. W. 96, 41 STAT. 806 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1568 (1946).
120 U. C. M. J. Art. 77-82.
121A. W. 96, 41 STAT. 806 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1568 (1946). This pro-
vision is now U. C. M. J. Art. 134.
122 U. C. M. J. Art. 87.
123 U. C. M. J. Art. 86.
124 U. C. K. J. Art. 92.
125 U. C. M. 3. Art. 93.
128 U. C. M,. 3. Art. 98; see note 93 supra, and discussion under "Command
Control."
127 U. C. M. J. Art. 105.
128 U. C. M. J. Art. 107.
129 U. C. M. J. Art. 110. This is the only article applicable solely to the
navy.
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less driving,180 and malingering.13 ' It can be seen that since
the offenses are specifically and separately listed the im-
portance of the general article, although retained by the
Code, will be greatly diminished.
A provision of the Code 'that may become as well known
as the former general article is Article 92 (3) that states that
any person who "is derelict in the performance of his duties,"
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. Although
this latter provision is applicable to any person subject to the
Code, it is interesting to observe that in the article applicable
only to officers and punishing "conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman," whereas formerly conviction involved a
mandatory dismissal from the service, 8 2 the Code now pro-
vides for punishment "as a court-martial may direct." 133 In
this respect it has been suggested that insofar as the new
provision will permit officers convicted of conduct unbecom-
ing an officer and a gentleman to remain in the service, it
"represents an unfortunate legislative lowering of standards
of officer conduct." '34
A reading of the punitive articles will show that the im-
provement effected by the Code consists of leaving no doubt
as to what is deemed punishable conduct.
VIII. ADDITIONAL CHANGES AND REFORMS
There are many other changes in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice which might profitably be discussed. For
example, the Code effects the important change of making
the right to refuse trial by Summary Court-Martial 135 avail-
able to all enlisted persons whereas formerly it extended only
130 U. C. M. 3. Art. 111.
131 U. C. M. J. Art. 115.
132A. W. 95, 41 STAT. 806 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1567 (1946); M. C. M.
254 (1949).
233 U. C. M. J. Art. 133.
13 4 WIENER, THE UNIrORm CODE OF MILITARY JusTICE 23 (1950).
135 The Summary Court-Martial (consisting of one officer) does not have
jurisdiction to try officers, warrant officers, cadets, aviation cadets or midship-
men, nor can it impose death, dismissal, dishonorable discharge or bad con-
duct discharge, confinement in excess of one month, hard labor without con-
finement in excess of forty-five days, restriction to limits in excess of two
months, or forfeiture of pay in excess of two-thirds of one month's pay.
U. C. M. J. Art. 20.
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to certain non-commissioned officers. By refusing to be tried
by a Summary Court-Martial the serviceman may be tried
either by a Special or General Court-Martial where he will
have the benefits of defense counsel and other safeguards
provided by the Code. The only exception to the absolute
right to object to trial by Summary Court-Martial is in the
case of a serviceman who has refused non-judicial punish-
ment under Article 15.136
A few other matters that have not been referred to per-
tain to some desirable innovations that were present in the
1948 Articles and have been retained by the Code. An
example of such a reform is the provision permitting an ac-
cused to petition for a new trial on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence or fraud on the court. The accused may
petition the Judge Advocate General for such new trial at
any time within one year after a court-martial sentence ex-
tending to death, dismissal, dishonorable or bad-conduct
discharge, or confinement for one year or more has been ap-
proved by the convening authority. 137
No discussion seems necessary concerning the constitu-
tional guarantees that have been present in the military law
and are now found in the Code, such as the prohibition
against double jeopardy,138 cruel and unusual punishment, 130
and the privilege against self-incrimination.
140
236 U. C. M. J. Art. 20, 15.
237 U. C. M. J. Art. 73. Another interesting change pertains to the attempt
to continue military jurisdiction as to servicemen who have been discharged.
With the exception involving frauds against the government, it has been the
lav that military jurisdiction terminates with military service. See United
States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Malanaphy, 168 F. 2d 503 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
335 U. S. 842 (1948), discussed 27 TEXAS L. REv. 548 (1949). The Code
provides for a continuing jurisdiction provided the offense is punishable by
confinement of five years or more, and provided further that the offense is
not triable in a state or federal court of the United States. U. C. M. J.
Art. 3(a) ; H. R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1948).238U S. CONST. AMEND. V; A. W. 40, 41 STAT. 795 (1920), 10 U. S. C.
§ 1511 (1946); U. C. M. J. Art. 44.
139 U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. VIII; A. W. 41, 41 STAT. 795 (1920), 10 U. S. C.
§ 1512 (1946) ; U. C. M. J. Art. 55.
140 US CoNS. AMEND. V; A. W. 24, 41 STAT. 792 (1920), 10 U. S. C§ 1495 (1946) ; U. C M. J. Art. 31. See Antieau, Courts-Mfartia and the
Constitution, 33 MAo L. Rxv. 25 (1949).
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IX. CoNCLusION
The great interest of Congress in matters of military
justice may be seen from the following duty imposed upon
the Court of Military Appeals and The Judge Advocates
General of the armed forces:
The Court of Military Appeals and The Judge Advocates General
of the armed forces shall meet annually to make a comprehensive
survey of the operation of this code and report to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
and to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Depart-
ments the number and status of pending cases and any recommenda-
tions relating to uniformity of sentence policies, amendments to this
code, and any other matters deemed appropriate. 141
It is clear that Congress did not consider its obligation
at an end with the enactment of the Code. The manifest in-
tent is to observe the progress of the Code in its actual
operation, and to make necessary amendments. This in-
volves a recognition of the fact that no code has yet attained
perfection. Even the finest code would fail in its operation
if its administration were to be entrusted to untrained per-
sonnel. It is in this area that the Code justifies the broadest
optimism. To bemoan the failure to establish truly indepen-
dent tribunals seems futile. It is preferable to enlist the aid
of The Judge Advocates General of the armed forces to draft
a Manual for Courts-Martial 142 that will declare clearly and
unmistakably the duties of all persons charged with the re-
sponsibility of administering military justice, and to provide
adequate and competent personnel whose exclusive duties
will be to inspect and supervise the courts-martial system in
actual operation.
141 U. C. M. J. Art. 67(g). The Code also retains the article entitled "Com-
plaints of wrongs," pursuant to which any member of the armed forces who
believes himself wronged by his commanding officer, and upon application to
such commander is refused redress, may complain to any superior officer who
shall forward the complaint to the officer exercising General Court-Martial
jurisdiction over the officer against whom it is made. The superior officer
shall take proper measures to redress the wrong, and shall transmit to the
appropriate Department a true statement of the complaint and the proceedings
had thereon.
142 The new Manual for Courts-Martial will probably be available prior to
publication of this article.
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However, since the Navy court-martial system was the
more archaic of the existing systems, under the new Code
navy personnel has attained the greater number of reforms.
As has been indicated the Code embodies numerous improve-
ments over the 1948 army and air force articles.
It is submitted that the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice, although not representing a complete victory for all
who clamored for court-martial reform, does represent a
definite step toward true reform and justifies the belief that
the Armed Forces Law of the future will not suffer such
criticism as was heaped upon the military and naval law of
the past.
